The debate on South Korea’s security relationships with the four great powers and North Korea was recently reheated.
The following are the main topics: Has the U.S.’ rigid policy toward the North Korean nuclear issue not aggravated the U.S.-North Korea relationship and intensified the tension in the Korean Peninsula? If this is true, is it wise for South Korea to increase South-North cooperation in the nonsecurity fields?
What are the most appropriate South Korean policies toward the U.S.’ uncompromising North Korea policy, North Korea’s dualist policy (a simultaneous pursuit of nuclear and economic development), the tense U.S.-China relationship and the aggravating U.S.-Russia relationship? How should South Korea deal with the intensifying hostile Japanese policy toward South Korea in this unstable security environment in Northeast Asia? The conservative and liberal camps are divided on these issues, as well as on the domestic issues.
If we know the security environment of Northeast Asia correctly, we can find the correct answers to the above questions. The Korean Peninsula divided into two antagonistic political entities is surrounded by three global powers. This geopolitical characteristic makes South Korea’s survival extremely vulnerable. Under such a geopolitical environment, the most appropriate foreign policy strategy for South Korea is to maintain an equidistance policy toward the big powers and the balance of power between the two Koreas.
But it is extremely difficult for Korea to maintain the equidistance policy because the three powers do not maintain good neighborly relationships with each other, mainly because of their geographical proximity and the Korean Peninsula’s strategic importance for them.
In the pre-World War II era, they attempted to rule Korea directly. In the post-World War II era, the peninsula’s strategic importance is not diminished, but they have to deal with two completely opposed political entities in Korea. This makes the security environment of Northeast Asia more complicated and unstable.
Unless they establish a concert of powers system or a collective security system including the two Koreas in the region, South Korea has only one choice: to maintain the balance of power in Northeast Asia and military forces sufficient to defend itself from North Korean aggression through forming an alliance with a big power outside the region. That country is the U.S.
South Korea is lucky in two respects: Through the alliance with the U.S., South Korea can maintain the balance of power in Northeast Asia and protect itself from nuclear North Korea. Sometimes, the two allies may disagree on the nature of the security environment in the region and the most appropriate strategies and tactics toward North Korea. But such disagreements can hardly undermine the U.S.-ROK security ties, because their security interests are mutually complementary.
Another controversial issue is North Korea’s claim that it has no choice but to become a nuclear power because the U.S. forces are like a dangling sword over its head. To eradicate this kind of fear, the U.S. needs to guarantee no first use of nuclear weapons and sign a nonaggression pact during or after the nuclear negotiations.
In addition, the four big powers should guarantee the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. The U.S.’ precondition that the talks cannot start unless North Korea pledges that the purpose of the negotiations is to dismantle its nuclear programs is realistic in view of North Korea’s past behavior. In this connection, the argument that the U.S. precondition for the resumption of the six-party talks has given North Korea enough time to expand and perfect its nuclear capabilities is not convincing, because whether the nuclear negotiations had been held or not, North Korea would have continued to perfect its nuclear capabilities clandestinely.
Another related question is whether South-North Korean cooperation in the non-security field and the denuclearization of North Korea can be pursued separately.
The view that since expanded South-North cooperation in the nonsecurity field will build mutual trust ― which in turn will make North Korean society more open and the country more conciliatory in the nuclear negotiations ― South-North economic cooperation should be pursued independently of the nuclear issue is contrasted with the view that South-North economic cooperation should be used as a carrot-and-stick tactic for the North’s denuclearization, because if North Korea becomes economically more self-confident, it is less likely to make concessions in the nuclear negotiations. It is better to pursue both approaches simultaneously, mainly because the two issues are not directly related to each other.
North Korean and Russian efforts to expand economic cooperation and China’s tactics of pitting one against the other in its relations with South Korea and the U.S. reveal the true nature of great power politics and North Korea’s desperate efforts for survival. South Korea need not worry about these developments because China’s and Russia’s pro-North Korea gestures will not affect South Korea-China and South Korea-Russia economic relationships while China and Russia will compete with each other over North Korea.
By the same token, the aggravation of relations between South Korea and Japan will not irrevocably damage security cooperation between the two countries, because the Northeast Asian geopolitical dynamics will not allow Japan to side with any of the neighboring big powers or North Korea.
In the final analysis, the recent developments in Northeast Asia will become a blessing in disguise in the long term. As long as South Korea and the U.S. are in agreement on the fundamentals ― the maintenance of the alliance and the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula ― peace in Northeast Asia and the Korean Peninsula will continue.
By Park Sang-seek
Park Sang-seek is a former rector of Kyung Hee University’s Graduate Institute of Peace Studies and the author of “Globalized Korea and Localized Globe.” ― Ed.
