Live anthrax bacteria were “inadvertently” shipped to Osan Air Base along with U.S. military labs and commercial labs in 11 states as well as Australia and Canada.
Upon being informed on May 27 that the anthrax sample used in training could possibly be live, Osan Air Base immediately destroyed the sample and decontaminated the facility. Twenty-two people who may have been exposed to live anthrax were provided appropriate medical measures. None of the personnel have shown signs of exposure and there is no risk to the public. This is what we know about the anthrax shipment so far.
According to the U.S. Department of Defense, active anthrax samples were shipped between March 2014 and April 2015. The shipments from the U.S. Army’s Dugway Proving Ground in Utah were stopped in May when the Defense Department became aware that the bacteria that were supposed to have been killed in an irradiation process were in fact active.
A commercial lab in Maryland in May found live anthrax in a shipment from the Dugway Proving Ground, which prompted the U.S military and health officials to launch an investigation. The Pentagon said that the samples of anthrax from a batch irradiated in March 2014 were found to be active. The probe also discovered another batch of live anthrax from 2008. While it has been confirmed that Australia received that batch, it was not clear when the samples from the 2008 batch were sent out or where they were sent, according to U.S. officials.
Under the current Status of Forces Agreement, the U.S. military is required to inform the Korean Centers for Disease Control and Prevention when bringing in biohazards. U.S. Forces Korea, however, maintains that it did not inform the Korean government agency about the anthrax sample because it was thought to be inactive and thus not hazardous.
It is troubling the deadly bacteria was brought into the country without the government’s knowledge. Given that the U.S. does not have a sterling record concerning anthrax ― government labs have come under fire before for sloppy management of the bacteria ― it is incredulous that the samples, even if considered inactive, were transported by a commercial courier service.
However, of greater concern is that the incident revealed the existence of an entity previously unknown to the public, the Joint United States Forces Korea Portal and Integrated Threat Recognition Program. USFK described the program as “testing currently fielded equipment and new systems that could better identify toxins and pathogens in the environment” and said it was the first time the training had been conducted.
Korean and U.S. leaders are often quoted as saying that the two countries enjoy a strong alliance. Yet, those declarations ring hollow when the U.S. brings in hazardous materials without informing its ally. Questions about when the anthrax was delivered or how much was delivered to Osan Air Base are still unanswered. The nature of the work here involving the anthrax is also not entirely clear.
U.S. Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter offered an apology and vowed that those responsible would be held accountable. However, this is not an issue that should be dismissed lightly. During the next SOFA meeting in July, the Korean government should push for a revision to the agreement that would make it mandatory for the U.S. military to inform the host country of transfers of hazardous materials. The government must also insist on being informed of what steps are being taken to ensure that similar mishaps do not recur.
