North Korea fires various kinds of rockets and missiles into the sea on an almost weekly basis while its young leader, with binoculars in his hand, beams beside the launching pad. Watching KBS replay the Pyongyang TV footage, we feel sorry for the money burnt away in the power demonstration that could be better used in feeding the starving people of the North. Yet, we are naturally annoyed.
As if reading our minds, Washington these days is pushing a plan to deploy THAAD, or Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense system, with its U.S. forces in Korea. At the same time, the U.S. is promoting Korea’s purchase of a new antiballistic missile system known to be well-suited for the conditions in this “theater.” Then we hear Beijing’s repeated warning to Seoul not to allow the deployment of THAAD in South Korea.
Sandwiched between the U.S. and China, Seoul has resorted to “three no’s” ― no request (from the U.S.), no consultation and no decision (by Korea). Yet discord is seen between the security policy makers at the Blue House and the ruling party over the desirability of what they call “strategic ambiguity.” In the political arena, the Saenuri seems generally in favor of THAAD deployment and the opposition, NPAD, against it.
First, official confirmation of Washington’s intent was made last week when the USFK admitted that feasibility surveys had been conducted on several candidate sites over South Korea. Now, the time has come for the South Korean government to abandon the meaningless and irresponsible three no’s.
As a deeply concerned citizen, I would instead suggest that our government adopt the policy of three a’s ― acknowledgement, assessment and adaptation.
THAAD is one of many antiballistic missile systems developed by the U.S., China, Russia, Israel, Japan and South Korea. But its advanced surveillance system that can look deep into China beyond North Korea caused Chinese fear that THAAD degrades its own missile program. Expert debates are centered on whether China’s concerns are justified regarding the radar surveillance question.
We have to secure both cooperative ties with China, as well as our alliance with the U.S., but none at the compromise of our sovereign right. The first step should therefore be to acknowledge what has happened between Korea and the U.S. There were reliable reports that the South Korean army and the Pentagon had exchanged information on THAAD since 2013 for Seoul’s research and possible purchase.
The two allies made their initial moves confidentially in consideration of Seoul’s sensitive position in regard to China’s objection. The USFK’s announcement of surveys on specific locations in South Korea now amounts to Washington’s pressure on Seoul to make a decision. Before a decision, however, we should assess how much THAAD will make us safer from the North’s missile threat ― and at what cost.
A few clicks on the Internet produces general information on THAAD from its first design by Lockheed Martin at the request of the Pentagon in the mid-1990s to the activation of war-fighting batteries in U.S. territory in 2008. The merit of THAAD is that the system offers by far the most adequate deterrence against North Korea’s Scud and Rodong missiles, which can hit any part of the South Korean territory.
The THAAD system is designed to destroy ballistic missiles in their terminal phase when they fly at the high altitude of 40 kilometers to 150 kilometers. THAAD’s counter-missile flying at MACH-8 is hit and kill with its kinetic power. The controversial part is the X-Band radar that accompanies THAAD, which reportedly has a surveillance range of 2,000 kilometers.
We know Washington has persuaded South Korea to forgo the development of the indigenous Korean Air and Missile Defense system and rely instead on the PAC-2 and PAC-3 antiballistic missiles, which hits targets at the low altitude of 20 kilometers to 40 kilometers. The U.S., while preparing to deploy THAAD at the USFK camp in Pyeongtaek, is believed to be pondering South Korea’s purchase under the foreign military sales program. The price is known to be $800 million for a fully operational battery of 48 missiles.
A cost-effect analysis should be made on a broad perspective. THAAD has emerged as an issue with immense importance in our security posture, comparable perhaps to the question of the takeover of wartime operational control from the U.S. Missile defense is a crucial business to neutralize the only area of North Korean superiority in the South Korean/North Korean contest. No interference by domestic politics should be allowed.
The opposition party needs to be involved in the assessment phase of the THAAD question so that President Park Geun-hye can be better able to seek a national consensus for whatever decision the government will make. We are encouraged by NPAD chairman Moon Jae-in’s remarks that there can be no partisan interest in the area of national security. It will only be tragic if our domestic politics is branded “pro-U.S. Saenuri, pro-China NPAD.”
The final decision will depend on how far Seoul can ease Beijing’s concerns about THAAD’s surveillance capabilities. Some military experts suggest that it is technically possible to ensure restrictions of the radar range to within 600 kilometers just to cover North Korea. This may invite China’s more positive consideration of the issue, but others argue that THAAD could be used as leverage to pressure Beijing toward taking determined actions to denuclearize North Korea.
Most South Koreans believe that China is responsible for North Korea’s nuclear and missile development. Beijing has done little more than verbally admonish Pyongyang’s missile launches and nuclear tests when it could have forced the North to alter or suspend its WMD programs by using its economic clout as its sole benefactor and ally. Seoul can tell Beijing that its THAAD decision could wait if meaningful progress is made in the denuclearization process on the Korean Peninsula.
China, having failed to keep North Korea from making weapons of mass destruction that shattered regional peace and stability, has no justification to force us to give up effective missile defense. Seoul officials have to make a determined approach to Beijing on the THAAD issue in the belief that this is a matter of national sovereignty.
Kim Myong-sik is a former editorial writer for The Korea Herald. He has long served as a military correspondent for the Korea Times. ― Ed.
